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Abstract
The article introduces a notion of a stochastic game with failure states and
proposes two logical systems with modality “coalition has a strategy to tran-
sition to a non-failure state with a given probability while achieving a given
goal.” The logical properties of this modality depend on whether the modal
language allows the empty coalition. The main technical results are a com-
pleteness theorem for a logical system with the empty coalition, a strong
completeness theorem for the logical system without the empty coalition,
and an incompleteness theorem which shows that there is no strongly com-
plete logical system in the language with the empty coalition.
1. Introduction
In this article we study coalition power in stochastic games. An example
of such a game is the road situation depicted in Figure 1. In this situation,
self-driving car a is trying to pass self-driving car b. Unexpectedly, a truck
moving in the opposite direction appears on the road. For the sake of sim-
plicity, we assume that cars a and b have only three strategies: slow-down
(−), maintain the current speed (0), and accelerate (+). We also assume
that the truck is too heavy to significantly change the speed before a possi-
ble collision. If cars a and b cooperate, there are two sensible things that they
can do: (i) car b can accelerate letting car a to slow down and to return to
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the position behind car b; (ii) car b can slow down letting car a to accelerate
and to pass before it reaches the truck.
b
a t
Figure 1: A Road Traffic Situation.
The diagram in Figure 2 describes probabilities of different outcomes of
all possible combinations of actions of cars a and b. This diagram has five
states: state p is the current (“passing”) state of the system. States ab and
ba represent outcomes in which car a ends up, respectively, behind and ahead
of car b. States fc and ft are “failure” states: in the first of them there is
a collision between cars, in the second car a collides with the truck. The
actual probabilities of possible outcomes for any give combination of actions
are captured by the labeled directed edges. For example, the directed edge
from state p to state ab labeled with − + /1.0 means that in the case (i)
above, when car a slows down (−) and car b accelerates (+), the system
safely transitions into state ab with probability 1.0. This means that coalition
{a, b} has a strategy that avoids collision with probability 1.0. We write this
as
[a, b]1.0(“Collision is avoided”).
At the same time, directed edge from state p to state ba is labeled with
+ − /0.9. Hence, in the case (ii) above, the car a will be able to pass car b
without collision with probability 0.9:
[a, b]0.9(“Pass without collision”).
The label +−, 0 − /0.1 on the directed edge from state p to failure state ft
denotes the fact that if car a either accelerates (+) or maintains the same
speed (0), while car b slows down (−), then car a will collide with the track
with probability 0.1.
Note that car a alone does not have a strategy to pass without colli-
sion with probability 0.9. Indeed, if car a decides to accelerate (+), then
depending on if car b slows down (−), maintains the current speed (0), or
accelerates (+), the probability of passing without collision will be 0.9, 0.6,
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and 0.0. Thus, although car a, of course, has a strategy to pass without
collision with probability 0.0:
[a]0.0(“Pass without collision”),
it does not have a strategy to pass that would guarantee survival with any
positive probability ε > 0:
¬[a]ε(“Pass without collision”).
+−, 0− / 0.1
+0, 0− / 0.2
fc ftp ba
−−, ++, 00 / 0.5 −−, ++, 00 / 0.5
−+ / 1.0
+− / 0.9−0, 0+ / 0.9
−0, 0+ / 0.1
+0, 0− / 0.6
+0, 0− / 0.2
ab
Figure 2: A Stochastic Game.
In this article we study properties of modality [C]pϕ that stands for “coali-
tion C has a strategy that achieves ϕ in all non-failure states and is guaran-
teed to avoid failure states with probability at least p”. If p = 1.0, then this is
essentially coalition power modality introduced by Marc Pauly [1, 2]. Pauly
proved the completeness of the basic logic of coalition power. His approach
has been widely studied in the literature [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14].
Alur, Henzinger, and Kupferman introduced Alternating-Time Temporal
Logic (ATL) that combines temporal and coalition modalities [15]. Goranko
and van Drimmelen [16] gave a complete axiomatization of ATL. Decidabil-
ity and model checking problems for ATL-like systems has also been widely
studied [17, 18, 19]. Chen and Lu added the probability of achieving a goal to
ATL and developed model checking algorithms for the proposed system [20].
Another version of ATL with probabilistic success was proposed by Bulling
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and Jamroga [21]. They considered modality 〈〈A〉〉pωϕ that stands for “coali-
tion C can bring about ϕ with success level of at least p when the opponents
behave according to ω” and investigated its model checking properties. Un-
like our approach in the current paper, neither of these works distinguish
failure states from non-failure states. The probability of success in their
systems is the probability of achieving ϕ, not the probability of avoiding a
failure state. Nova´k and Jamroga [22, Definition 2.5] defined probability of
a “successful execution” of an action as probability of an action to achieve
its expected effect. They called failure any execution when an action does
not achieve the expected (“annotated”) effect. This, in essence, is the prob-
ability studied in our article. Since we consider a multiagent setting, we
find it more intuitive to talk about failure states rather than failure of in-
dividual actions or action profiles. Later in the paper [22], however, Nova´k
and Jamroga introduced modality [τ ]pϕ that refers to probability of an agent
program τ to achieve goal ϕ and not a probability of individual actions to
fail. Huang, Su, and Zhang combined perfect recall and coalition power to
achieve a goal with a certain probability. They discussed model checking
properties of their logical system [23]. Coalition power to achieve a goal
with a certain probability is also used in PRISM-games, a model checker for
stochastic multi-player games [24, 25]. None of these works on probabilistic
extensions of ATL contain completeness results.
Alternative approaches to expressing the power to achieve a goal in a
temporal setting are the STIT logic [26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and Strategy Logic [31,
32, 18, 33]. Broersen, Herzig, and Troquard have shown that coalition logic
can be embedded into a variation of STIT logic [34]. We are not aware of
any probabilistic versions of either STIT or Strategy Logic.
2. Outline of the Contribution
In this article we axiomatize the properties of modality [C]p in stochastic
game. It turns out that the axiomatization results depend significantly on
whether the language allows the empty coalition or not. If the empty coalition
is allowed, then one can use it to write formula [∅]p>, which means that the
system will unavoidably survive with probability p. Similarly, [∅]pϕ means
that the system will unavoidably survive with probability p and statement
ϕ will be true in the next state. Unavoidability cannot be expressed in
the language without the empty coalition. In this article we introduce two
different logical systems for modality [C]p. The first of these systems, L,
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allows coalition C to be empty and the second, L+, does not. We describe the
syntax and semantics of L and L+ in Section 3. We introduce the axioms and
the inference rules for the logical systems in Section 4 and prove the soundness
of the axioms in Section 5. The main technical contributions of this article are
the completeness theorem for system L and the strong completeness theorem
for system L+, which we prove in Section 6. Additionally, in Section 7
we prove that no strongly sound logical system is strongly complete in the
language with the empty coalition. In Section 8 we discuss the decidability
of the systems. Finally, we conclude the article in Section 9.
3. Syntax and Semantics
In the current section we introduce the formal syntax and the formal
semantics for logical systems L and L+. The language Φ of the first of these
systems allows set C to be empty and language Φ+ of the second does not.
In both cases, we assume a fixed finite set of agents A and a fixed set of
propositional variables. Additionally, a coalition is any subset of A.
Definition 1. Let Φ be the minimal set of formulae such that
1. v ∈ Φ for each propositional variable v,
2. ¬ϕ, ϕ→ ψ ∈ Φ for all formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ,
3. [C]pϕ ∈ Φ for each coalition C, each real number p such that 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
and each formula ϕ ∈ Φ.
In other words, Φ is the language specified by the following grammar
ϕ := v | ¬ϕ | ϕ→ ϕ | [C]pϕ.
We assume that Boolean constants > and ⊥ are defined in our languages
in the standard way. By Φ+ we denote the subset of Φ that contains all
formulae in Φ that do not use empty coalitions. In other words, language Φ+
could be defined as in Definition 1 but with an additional assumption that
coalition C is not empty.
Let XY be the set of all functions from set Y to set X.
Definition 2. A tuple (S, F,D, P, pi) is a stochastic game, if
1. S is a set (of states),
2. F ⊆ S is a set (of failure states),
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3. D is a nonempty set (domain of actions),
4. P is a function from set S ×DA × S into set [0, 1] such that∑
s′∈S
P (s, δ, s′) = 1
for each state s ∈ S and each function δ ∈ DA,
5. pi is a function from propositional variables into subsets of S.
By F we denote the complement S \F of the set F . A function from set DA
is called a complete action profile.
In the introductory example depicted in Figure 2, the set of agents A
consists of car a and car b. The set of states S is {ab, fc, p, ft, ba} and the set
of failure states F is {fc, ft}. The domain of actions D is {−, 0,+}. Although
formally a complete action profile δ is a function from set of all agents A to
the domain of actions D, in the case of our introductory example it is more
convenient to refer to such profiles by pairs αβ, where α = δ(a) and β = δ(b).
The function P is specified by labels on the directed edges in the diagram.
We use commas to denote multiple functions with the same probability. For
example, the label “−0, 0 + /0.9” on the directed edge from state p to state
ab means that P (p,−0, ab) = 0.9 and P (p, 0+, ab) = 0.9.
Next is the key definition of this article. Its item 4 formally specifies the
semantics of the modality [C]p. In this definition we use term action profile
of a coalition to refer to a function δ that assigns an action δ(a) to each agent
a of a coalition C. Also, note that for any two relations R1, R2 ⊆ X × Y , we
have R1 ⊆ R2 if every pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y in relation R1 is also in relation
R2. If f and g are partial functions (functional relations), then f ⊆ g means
that function g is an extension of function f .
Definition 3. For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi) and
any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, the satisfiability relation s  ϕ is defined recursively as
follows:
1. s  v if s ∈ pi(v), for any propositional variable v,
2. s  ¬ϕ if s 1 ϕ,
3. s  ϕ→ ψ if s 1 ϕ or s  ψ,
4. s  [C]pϕ when there is an action profile δ ∈ DC of coalition C such
that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA if δ ⊆ δ′, then
(a)
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p,
(b) if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
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4. Logical Systems
In this section we introduce the axioms and the inference rules of logical
systems L and L+ in languages Φ and Φ+ respectively. In addition to propo-
sitional tautologies in the corresponding language, each system contains the
following axioms:
1. Cooperation: [C1]p(ϕ→ ψ)→ ([C2]qϕ→ [C1 ∪ C2]max{p,q}ψ),
where C1 ∩ C2 = ∅,
2. Monotonicity: [C]pϕ→ [C]qϕ, where q ≤ p,
3. Unachievability of Falsehood: ¬[C]p⊥, where p > 0.
The Cooperation axiom in the form without subscripts goes back to Marc
Pauly [1, 2]. Informally, it says that two coalitions can combine their strate-
gies to achieve a common goal. The assumption that coalitions C1 and C2
are disjoint is important because a hypothetical common agent of these two
coalitions might be required to choose different actions under strategies of
these two coalitions.
Our version of the Cooperation axiom adds probability of non-failure
subscript to the original version of this axiom. Perhaps one might think
that the conclusion of the axiom should have subscript min{p, q} rather than
max{p, q}. This is not true because, according to Definition 3, statement
[C]pϕ means that coalition C has a strategy to achieve ϕ with probability of
non-failure of at least p regardless of what actions are chosen by the other
agents.
The Monotonicity axiom says that if a coalition C can achieve goal ϕ
with probability of non-failure of at least p, then coalition C can achieve ϕ
with probability of non-failure of at least q, where q ≤ p.
Finally, the Unachievability of Falsehood axiom says that no coalition can
achieve falsehood with a positive probability.
We write `L ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ is provable from the above axioms using
the Modus Ponens and the Necessitation inference rules:
ϕ, ϕ→ ψ
ψ
ϕ
[C]0ϕ
.
Notice that the Necessitation inference rule with positive subscript is not,
generally speaking, valid. Indeed, formula > is universally true but coalition
C may not have a strategy that guarantees the non-failure of the system
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with a positive probability. Thus, [C]p> is not a universally true formula for
p > 0.
Let `L+ ϕ if formula ϕ ∈ Φ+ is provable (using only formulae in language
Φ+) from the above axioms using the Modus Ponens, the Necessitation, and
the Monotonicity
ϕ→ ψ
[C]pϕ→ [C]pψ
inference rules. We excluded the Monotonicity rule from system L because,
as we show below, it is derivable in L.
Lemma 1. Monotonicity inference rule is derivable in system L.
Proof. Suppose that `L ϕ→ ψ. Thus, `L [∅]0(ϕ→ ψ) by the Necessitation
inference rule. Consider now the following instance of the Cooperation axiom:
[∅]0(ϕ → ψ) → ([C]pϕ → [C]pψ). Therefore, `L [C]pϕ → [C]pψ by the
Modus Ponens inference rule.

We write X `L ϕ (or X `L+ ϕ) if formula ϕ ∈ Φ (or ϕ ∈ Φ+) is provable
from the theorems of logical system L (or L+) and a set of additional axioms
X using only the Modus Ponens inference rule. Note that if set X is empty,
then statement X `L ϕ is equivalent to `L ϕ and statement X `L+ ϕ is
equivalent to `L+ ϕ. We often write ` ϕ and X ` ϕ if it is clear from the
context which logical system we refer to. We say that set X is consistent if
X 0 ⊥.
Lemma 2 (deduction). For either L or L+, if X,ϕ ` ψ, then X ` ϕ→ ψ.
Proof. Suppose that sequence ψ1, . . . , ψn is a proof from set X ∪{ϕ} and the
theorems of our logical system that uses the Modus Ponens inference rule
only. In other words, for each k ≤ n, either
1. ` ψk, or
2. ψk ∈ X, or
3. ψk is equal to ϕ, or
4. there are i, j < k such that formula ψj is equal to ψi → ψk.
It suffices to show that X,ϕ ` ψk for each k ≤ n. We prove this by induction
on k through considering the four cases above separately.
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Case 1: ` ψk. Note that ψk → (ϕ → ψk) is a propositional tautology, and
thus, is an axiom of our logical system. Hence, ` ϕ → ψk by the Modus
Ponens inference rule. Therefore, X ` ϕ→ ψk.
Case 2: ψk ∈ X. Then, X ` ψk.
Case 3: formula ψk is equal to ϕ. Thus, ϕ→ ψk is a propositional tautology.
Therefore, X ` ϕ→ ψk.
Case 4: formula ψj is equal to ψi → ψk for some i, j < k. Thus, by the
induction hypothesis, X ` ϕ → ψi and X ` ϕ → (ψi → ψk). Note that
formula (ϕ → ψi) → ((ϕ → (ψi → ψk)) → (ϕ → ψk)) is a propositional
tautology. Therefore, X ` ϕ→ ψk by applying the Modus Ponens inference
rule twice. 
Note that it is important for the above proof that X ` ϕ stands for
derivability only using the Modus Ponens inference rule. For example, if the
Necessitation inference rule is allowed, then the proof will have to include
one more case where ψk is formula [C]0ψi for some coalition C ⊆ A, and
some integer i < k. In this case we will need to prove that if X ` ϕ → ψi,
then X ` ϕ→ [C]0ψi, which is not true.
Lemma 3 (Lindenbaum). For either L or L+, any consistent set of for-
mulae can be extended to a maximal consistent set of formulae.
Proof. The standard proof of Lindenbaum’s lemma applies here [35, Propo-
sition 2.14]. However, since the formulae in our logical systems use real
numbers in subscript, the set of formulae is uncountable. Thus, the proof of
Lindenbaum’s lemma in our case relies on the Axiom of Choice. 
We conclude this section by giving an example of a formal derivation in
our logical systems. This result is used later in the proof of the completeness.
Lemma 4. For any coalitions C,D ⊆ A, if C ⊆ D, then
1. `L [C]pϕ→ [D]pϕ for each formula ϕ ∈ Φ,
2. `L+ [C]pϕ→ [D]pϕ for each formula ϕ ∈ Φ+, where set C is not empty.
Proof. We give a common proof for both parts of the lemma. If C = D,
then ` [C]pϕ → [D]pϕ because formula [C]pϕ → [D]pϕ is a propositional
tautology.
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Suppose now that C ( D. Thus set D\C is not empty. Note that ϕ→ ϕ
is a propositional tautology. Thus, ` [D \ C]0(ϕ → ϕ) by the Necessitation
inference rule. At the same time, because (D \ C) ∩ C = ∅, the following
formula is an instance of the Cooperation axiom:
[D \ C]0(ϕ→ ϕ)→ ([C]pϕ→ [(D \ C) ∪ C]max{0,p}ϕ).
Hence, by the Modus Ponens inference rule,
` [C]pϕ→ [(D \ C) ∪ C]max{0,p}ϕ.
Then, ` [C]pϕ→ [D]pϕ, because C ⊆ D and 0 ≤ p. 
5. Soundness
In this section we prove the soundness of each of our axioms as a separate
lemma. The same proof applies to both system L and system L+. The
soundness of the systems is stated in the end of the section as Theorem 1.
Lemma 5. For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi), any
coalitions C1 and C2, any formulae ϕ, ψ ∈ Φ, and any real numbers p, q such
that 0 ≤ p, q ≤ 1, if s  [C1]p(ϕ → ψ), s  [C2]qϕ, and C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, then
s  [C1 ∪ C2]max{p,q}ψ.
Proof. By Definition 3, assumption s  [C1]p(ϕ → ψ) implies that there is
an action profile δ1 ∈ DC1 such that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA,
if δ1 ⊆ δ′, then
1.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p,
2. if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ϕ→ ψ, for each t ∈ F .
Additionally, by Definition 3, assumption s  [C2]qϕ implies that there is an
action profile δ1 ∈ DC2 such that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA if
δ2 ⊆ δ′, then
3.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ q,
4. if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
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Let action profile δ of coalitions C1 ∪ C2 be defined as
δ(a) =
{
δ1(a), if a ∈ C1,
δ2(a), if a ∈ C2.
(1)
Action profile δ is well-defined because coalitions C1 and C2 are disjoint by
an assumption of the lemma.
Consider an arbitrary complete action profile δ′ such that δ ⊆ δ′. Note
that
δ1 ⊆ δ ⊆ δ′, (2)
δ2 ⊆ δ ⊆ δ′ (3)
by equation (1) and the assumption δ ⊆ δ′. Thus, by Definition 3 and the
above assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 4,
1.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ max{p, q},
2. if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ψ, for each t ∈ F .
Therefore, s  [C1 ∪ C2]max p,qψ by Definition 3. 
Lemma 6. For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi), any
coalition C, any formula ϕ ∈ Φ, and any real numbers p, q such that 0 ≤ q ≤
p ≤ 1, if s  [C]pϕ, then s  [C]qϕ.
Proof. By Definition 3, assumption s  [C]pϕ implies that there is an action
profile δ1 ∈ DC such that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA if δ1 ⊆ δ′,
then
1.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p,
2. if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
Note that
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p ≥ q by assumption q ≤ p of the lemma.
Therefore, s  [C]qϕ by Definition 3. 
Lemma 7. For any state s ∈ F of a stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi), any
coalition C, and any real number p, if 0 < p ≤ 1, then s 1 [C]p⊥.
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Proof. Suppose that s  [C]p⊥. Thus, by Definition 3, there is an action
profile δ1 ∈ DC such that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA if δ1 ⊆ δ′,
then
1.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p,
2. if P (s, δ′, t) > 0, then t  ϕ, for each t ∈ F .
Notice that
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p > 0 due to the assumption 0 < p of the
lemma. Hence, there exists state t ∈ F such that P (s, δ′, t) > 0. Thus, t  ⊥
by item 2 above, which contradicts the definition of ⊥ and Definition 3. 
The soundness theorem for our logical systems with respect to the se-
mantics described above follows from Lemma 5, Lemma 6, and Lemma 7.
Theorem 1. For either L or L+, if ` ϕ, then s  ϕ for each state s ∈ F
of each stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi).
6. Completeness
In this section we prove weak completeness of system L and strong com-
pleteness of L+ with respect to the semantics of stochastic games. These
results are stated later in this section as Theorem 2 and Theorem 3.
Let Ψ be either language Φ or Φ+ and Σ be any subset of Ψ such that
(a) Σ is closed with respect to subformulae and (b) if σ ∈ Σ, then ¬σ ∈ Σ,
unless the formula σ itself is a negation. We distinguish Σ from the whole
set Ψ so that later set Σ could be assumed to be finite. We start the proof
by defining the canonical stochastic game G(Ψ,Σ) = (S, F,D, P, pi).
Definition 4. Set S consists of all maximal consistent subsets of Σ and an
additional “failure” state f .
Definition 5. F = {f}.
Definition 6. D is the set of all pairs (ϕ, p) where ϕ ∈ Σ and p is an
arbitrary real number.
Informally, by choosing the action (ϕ, p), the agent is requesting the game
to transition to a non-failure state with probability at least p and formula ϕ
to be true at that state. The game might grant or ignore this request. In
particular, the game ignores the request if p /∈ [0, 1].
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Next, we define function P . This is done in Definition 9 through auxiliary
functions µ(s, δ) and T (s, δ). Function µ(s, δ) specifies the probability of the
canonical game to transition from state s under complete action profile δ into
a into non-failure state. For each [C]pϕ ∈ s we want the game to transition
to a non-failure state with probability at least p if all members of coalition
C choose action (ϕ, p). Thus, we define µ(s, δ) to be the maximum among
such p. In the definition below we assume that the maximum of the empty
set is equal to 0.
Definition 7. For each state s ∈ F and each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,
let µ(s, δ) = max{p | [C]pϕ ∈ s,∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))}.
Lemma 8. If Ψ = Φ and set Σ is finite, then for each state s ∈ F and each
profile δ ∈ DA, value µ(s, δ) is well-defined and µ(s, δ) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Consider set X = {p | [C]pϕ ∈ s,∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))}. Note that
X ⊆ [0, 1] by Definition 1. To prove that value µ(s, δ) is well-defined by
Definition 7, it suffices to show that set X is finite. Indeed, set s is finite
because it is a subset of finite set Σ. Therefore, set X is finite by the choice
of set X. 
Lemma 9. If Ψ = Φ+, then for each state s ∈ F and each profile δ ∈ DA,
value µ(s, δ) is well-defined and µ(s, δ) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Consider set X = {p | [C]pϕ ∈ s,∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))}. Note that
X ⊆ [0, 1] by Definition 1. To prove that value µ(s, δ) is well-defined by
Definition 7, it suffices to show that set X is finite. Recall that set of all
agents A is finite. Thus, set {p | ∃a ∈ A ∃ϕ ∈ Φ (δ(a) = (ϕ, p))} is finite.
Therefore, set X is finite because any coalition C in a formula [C]pϕ ∈ Φ+
is nonempty. 
Function T (s, δ) specifies all non-failure states to which the game is able
to transition from state s under complete action profile δ with non-zero prob-
ability. Informally, if [C]pϕ ∈ s and all members of coalition C choose action
(ϕ, p), then statement ϕ belongs to each set in T (s, δ).
Definition 8. For each state s ∈ F and each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,
let T (s, δ) be the set of all s′ ∈ F such that
{ϕ | [C]pϕ ∈ s,∀a ∈ C(δ(a) = (ϕ, p))} ⊆ s′.
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We are now ready to define function P (s, δ, s′) that specifies the proba-
bility of the canonical game to transition from a state s to a state s′ under a
complete action profile δ.
Definition 9. For each state s ∈ S, each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,
and each state s′ ∈ S,
P (s, δ, s′) =

µ(s, δ)
|T (s, δ)| , if s ∈ F and s
′ ∈ T (s, δ),
1− µ(s, δ), if s ∈ F and s′ = f,
1, if s = s′ = f,
0, otherwise,
where |T (s, δ)| is the size of set T (s, δ).
We prove that
∑
s′∈F P (s, δ, s
′) = 1 in Lemma 13. But first we show that
µ(s, δ) is an upper bound on the sum of probabilities of transitioning to a
non-failure state.
Lemma 10. For each state s ∈ F , each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,∑
s′∈F
P (s, δ, s′) ≤ µ(s, δ).
Proof. We consider the following two cases separately:
Case I: T (s, δ) = ∅. Then, by Definition 9 and either Lemma 8 or Lemma 9,
∑
s′∈F
P (s, δ, s′) =
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′)
=
∑
s′∈∅
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
0 = 0 ≤ µ(s, δ).
Case II: T (s, δ) 6= ∅. Then, by Definition 9,
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∑
s′∈F
P (s, δ, s′) =
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′)
=
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
µ(s, δ)
|T (s, δ)| +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
0
= µ(s, δ) + 0 ≤ µ(s, δ).

Definition 10. pi(v) = {s ∈ F | v ∈ s}.
This concludes the definition of the canonical stochastic game G(Ψ,Σ) =
(S, F,D, P, pi) in cases when either Σ is finite or Ψ = Φ+. Throughout the
rest of this section we assume that one of these two conditions is true.
The next lemma is the key lemma in the proof of the completeness. It
shows that if ¬[C]pϕ ∈ s, then in state s coalition C has no strategy to
transition to a non-failure state with probability at least p and to guarantee
that ϕ is true in that state.
Lemma 11. For each state s ∈ F , each formula ¬[C]pϕ ∈ s, and each
δ ∈ DC, there is δ′ ∈ DA such that δ ⊆ δ′ and one of the following is true
1. µ(s, δ′) < p or
2. there is a state s′ ∈ F where P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 and ¬ϕ ∈ s′.
Proof. Consider function δ′ ∈ DA such that
δ′(a) =
{
δ(a), if a ∈ C,
(>,−1), otherwise. (4)
Suppose that µ(s, δ′) ≥ p. We will show that there is a state s′ ∈ F such
that P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 and ¬ϕ ∈ s′. Consider set
X0 = {¬ϕ} ∪ {ψ | [B]qψ ∈ s,∀a ∈ B(δ′(a) = (ψ, q))}.
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First, we prove that set X0 is consistent. Suppose the opposite, thus there
must exist formulae [B1]q1ψ1, . . . , [Bn]qnψn ∈ s such that
∀i ≤ n ∀a ∈ Bi (δ′(a) = (ψi, qi)) (5)
ψ1, . . . , ψn ` ϕ. (6)
Without loss of generality, we can assume that formulae ψ1, . . . , ψn are
distinct. Note that sets B1, . . . , Bn are pairwise disjoint because of state-
ment (5). Due to Definition 9,
q1, . . . , qn ≤ µ(s, δ′). (7)
Additionally, by Definition 9 and the assumption of the case, we can suppose
that there is an integer m such that 1 ≤ m ≤ n and
qm = µ(s, δ
′). (8)
Furthermore, we can assume that there is n′ ≤ n such that Bi ⊆ C for each
i ≤ n′ and Bi * C for each i > n′.
Let us first show that m ≤ n′. Indeed, suppose that there is a0 ∈ Bm \C.
Thus, δ′(a0) = (>,−1) by equation (4). Hence, qm = −1 due to equation (5).
Recall that µ(s, δ′) = qm by the choice of index m. Thus µ(s, δ′) = −1, which
contradicts Lemma 8 (or Lemma 9 in case of system L+). Therefore, m ≤ n′.
Next, note that for each i > n′ we have ψi = > because Bi * C and due
to equality (4) and equality (5). Hence, ψ1, . . . , ψn′ ` ϕ by statement (6).
By Lemma 2 applied n times,
` ψ1 → (ψ2 → . . . (ψn′ → ϕ) . . . ).
Note that n′ 6= 0 because 1 ≤ m ≤ n′. So, by the Monotonicity inference
rule,
` [B1]q1ψ1 → [B1]q1(ψ2 → . . . (ψn′ → ϕ) . . . )).
By the Modus Ponens inference rule,
[B1]q1ψ1 ` [B1]q1(ψ2 → . . . (ψn′ → ϕ) . . . )).
By the Cooperation axiom and the Modus Ponens rule,
[B1]q1ψ1, [B2]q2ψ2 ` [B1 ∪B2]max{q1,q2}(ψ3 → . . . (ψn′ → ϕ) . . . )).
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By repeating the previous step n− 2 more times,
[B1]q1ψ1, . . . , [Bn′ ]qn′ψn′ ` [B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn′ ]max{q1,...,qn′}ϕ.
Thus, by the choice of formulae [B1]q1ψ1, . . . , [Bn′ ]qn′ψn′ ,
s ` [B1 ∪ · · · ∪Bn′ ]max{q1,...,qn′}ϕ.
Then, by Lemma 4 and because B1, . . . , Bn′ ⊆ C,
s ` [C]max{q1,...,qn′}ϕ.
Recall that q′ ≤ n′. Thus, max{q1, . . . , qn′} = µ(s, δ′) by inequality (7) and
equation (8). Hence, s ` [C]µ(s,δ′)ϕ. Thus, s ` [C]pϕ by the Monotonicity
axiom and the assumption µ(s, δ′) ≥ p. Then, ¬[C]pϕ /∈ s due to consistency
of set s, which contradicts the assumption of the lemma. Therefore, set X0
is consistent. By Lemma 3, there is a maximal consistent extension s′ of set
X0. Note that ¬ϕ ∈ s′ by the choice of set X0.
Note that s′ ∈ T (s, δ′) by Definition 8 and the choice of sets X0 and s′.
Thus, set T (s, δ′) is not empty. Hence, by the assumption of the case,
P (s, δ′, s′) =
µ(s, δ′)
|T (s, δ′)| > 0.
This concludes the proof of the lemma. 
Recall that we left unproven the fact that
∑
s′∈F P (s, δ, s
′) = 1. This will
be shown in Lemma 13 using the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 12. For each state s ∈ F and each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,
if set T (s, δ) is empty, then µ(s, δ) = 0.
Proof. Suppose that µ(s, δ) 6= 0. Thus, µ(s, δ) > 0 by either Lemma 8
or Lemma 9. Then, ¬[A]µ(s,δ)/2⊥ ∈ s by the Unachievability of Falsehood
axiom. Hence, by Lemma 11 there is a complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA such
that δ ⊆ δ′ and one of the following is true
1. µ(s, δ′) < µ(s, δ)/2 or
2. there is a state s′ ∈ F where P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 and ¬⊥ ∈ s′.
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Note that assumption δ ⊆ δ′ implies that δ = δ′ because δ is a complete action
profile. Thus, µ(s, δ′) = µ(s, δ) > µ(s, δ)/2 by either Lemma 8 or Lemma 9.
Hence, there is a state s′ ∈ F such that P (s, δ, s′) = P (s, δ′, s′) > 0. Then,
s′ ∈ T (s, δ) by Definition 9. Therefore, set T (s, δ) is not empty.

Lemma 13. For each state s ∈ S and each complete action profile δ ∈ DA,∑
s′∈S
P (s, δ, s′) = 1.
Proof. We consider the following three cases separately.
Case I: s = f . Thus, by Definition 9,∑
s′∈S
P (s, δ, s′) =
∑
s′∈S
P (f, δ, s′) = P (f, δ, f) +
∑
s′∈F
P (f, δ, s′) = 1 +
∑
s′∈F
0 = 1.
Case II: s ∈ F and T (s, δ) = ∅. Hence, µ(s, δ) = 0 by Lemma 12. Then,
by Definition 9,∑
s′∈S
P (s, δ, s′) = P (s, δ, f) +
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′)
= 1− µ(s, δ) +
∑
s′∈∅
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
0 = 1.
Case III: s ∈ F and T (s, δ) 6= ∅. By Definition 9,∑
s′∈S
P (s, δ, s′) = P (s, δ, f) +
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′) +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
P (s, δ, s′)
= 1− µ(s, δ) +
∑
s′∈T (s,δ)
µ(s, δ)
|T (s, δ)| +
∑
s′∈F\T (s,δ)
0
= 1− µ(s, δ) + µ(s, δ) + 0 = 1.

The following lemma shows that if [C]pϕ ∈ s, then in state s coalition C
has a strategy which guarantees that the game transitions to a non-failure
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state with probability at least p and ϕ will be true in that state.
Lemma 14. For any state s ∈ F and any formula [C]pϕ ∈ s, there is an
action profile δ ∈ DC such that for any complete action profile δ′ and any
state s′ ∈ F , if δ ⊆ δ′ and P (s, δ′, s′) > 0, then ϕ ∈ s′.
Proof. Consider any state s ∈ F and any formula [C]pϕ. Let action profile
δ ∈ DC be defined as following: δ(a) = (ϕ, p) for each agent a ∈ C.
Let s′ ∈ F be a state and δ′ ∈ DA be a complete action profile such that
δ ⊆ δ′ and P (s, δ′, s′) > 0. Note that δ′(a) = δ(a) = (ϕ, p) for each agent
a ∈ C by the choice of action profile δ.
At the same time, s′ ∈ T (s, δ′) because P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 by Definition 9.
Therefore, ϕ ∈ s′ by Definition 8 because [C]pϕ ∈ s and δ′(a) = (ϕ, p) for
each agent a ∈ C. 
The next lemma is the standard induction lemma in the proof of complete-
ness. It brings together the results established in Lemma 11 and Lemma 14.
Lemma 15. ϕ ∈ s iff s  ϕ for any formula ϕ ∈ Ψ and any maximal
consistent set s ∈ F .
Proof. We prove the lemma by structural induction on formula ϕ. The
case when formula ϕ is a propositional variable follows from Definition 10
and Definition 3. The case when formula ϕ is a negation or an implication
follows from Definition 3 and the maximality and the consistency of set s in
the standard way. Let us now suppose that formula ϕ has the form [C]pψ.
(⇒) : Suppose that [C]pψ ∈ s. Thus, by Lemma 14, there is an action profile
δ ∈ DC such that for any complete action profile δ′ and any state s′ ∈ F ,
if δ ⊆ δ′ and P (s, δ′, s′) > 0, then ψ ∈ s′. Note that statement ψ ∈ s′ is
equivalent to s′  ψ by the induction hypothesis. Thus, for any complete
action profile δ′ and any state s′ ∈ F , if δ ⊆ δ′ and P (s, δ′, s′) > 0, then
s′  ψ. Therefore, s  [C]pψ by Definition 3.
(⇐) : Suppose that s  [C]pψ. Thus, by Definition 3, there is an action
profile δ ∈ DC such that for any complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA if δ ⊆ δ′,
then
1.
∑
t∈F P (s, δ
′, t) ≥ p,
2. if P (s, δ′, s′) > 0, then s′  ψ, for each s′ ∈ F .
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Thus, by Lemma 10,
µ(s, δ) ≥ p. (9)
Assume that [C]pψ /∈ s. Thus, ¬[C]pψ ∈ s due to the maximality of set
s. Hence, by Lemma 11 there is δ′ ∈ DA such that δ ⊆ δ′ and one of the
following is true:
3. µ(s, δ′) < p,
4. there is an s′ ∈ F such that P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 and ¬ϕ ∈ s′.
Note that statement 3 can not be true due to inequality (9). Thus, there is
s′ ∈ F where P (s, δ′, s′) > 0 and ¬ψ ∈ s′. Hence, ψ /∈ s due to the consis-
tency of set s′. Thus, s′ 1 ψ by the induction hypothesis, which contradicts
to statement 2 above. 
We are now ready to state and to prove the (weak) completeness for
system L and strong completeness for system L+.
Theorem 2. If ϕ ∈ Φ and 0L ϕ, then there is a state s of a stochastic game
such that s 1 ϕ.
Proof. Let Σ ⊆ Φ be any finite set of formulae such that (a) ¬ϕ ∈ Σ;
(b) Σ is closed with respect to subformulae; (c) if σ ∈ Σ, then ¬σ ∈ Σ,
unless formula σ itself is a negation. Consider canonical stochastic game
G(Φ,Σ) = (S, F,D, P, pi).
By Lemma 3, assumption 0L ϕ implies that there is a maximal consistent
set s ⊆ Σ such that ¬ϕ ∈ s. Note that s ∈ S by Definition 4 and ϕ /∈ s
because set s is consistent. Therefore, s 1 ϕ by Lemma 15.

Theorem 3. If X ⊆ Φ+, ϕ ∈ Φ+, and X 0L+ ϕ, then there is a state s of a
stochastic game such that s  χ for each χ ∈ X and s 1 ϕ.
Proof. Let (S, F,D, P, pi) be the canonical stochastic game G(Φ+,Φ+). Sup-
pose that X 0L+ ϕ. Hence, set X ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent in L+. By Lemma 3,
there is a maximal consistent in L+ extension s ⊆ Φ+ of set X∪{¬ϕ}. Then,
s ∈ S by Definition 4. Note that ϕ /∈ s due to the consistency of set s. Also,
χ ∈ s for each χ ∈ X because X ⊆ s. Therefore, s  χ for each χ ∈ X and
s 1 ϕ by Lemma 15. 
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7. Incompleteness
In this section we show that no logical system in language Φ is strongly
complete with respect to the semantics of stochastic games. This result is
formally stated as Theorem 4.
Definition 11. X semantically entails ϕ, written as X  ϕ, when for any
state s of any stochastic game, if s  χ for each χ ∈ X, then s  ϕ.
Definition 12. A logical system S is strongly sound with respect to stochas-
tic games if X `S ϕ implies X  ϕ for each set of formulae X and each
formula ϕ.
Definition 13. A logical system S is strongly complete with respect to stochas-
tic games if X  ϕ implies X `S ϕ for each set of formulae X and each
formula ϕ.
Theorem 4 (incompleteness). Any strongly sound with respect to stochas-
tic games logical system in language Φ is not strongly complete.
Proof. Suppose that a logical system S in language Φ is strongly sound
and strongly complete with respect to stochastic games. Consider following
infinite subset of Φ:
X = {[∅]1−10−n> | n ≥ 0} = {[∅]0>, [∅]0.9>, [∅]0.99>, . . . }.
Claim 1. X  [∅]1>.
Proof of Claim. Suppose that s  [∅]1−10−n> for each n ≥ 0 for some
state s ∈ S of a stochastic game (S, F,D, P, pi). Thus, by Definition 3, for
each n ≥ 0 there is an action profile δn ∈ D∅ such that for each complete
action profile δ′ ∈ DA, if δn ⊆ δ′, then∑
t∈F
P (s, δ′, t) ≥ 1− 10−n.
Since δn is an action profile of an empty coalition, statement δn ⊆ δ′ is
vacuously true for any complete action profile δ′. Hence, for each n ≥ 0 and
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each complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA,∑
t∈F
P (s, δ′, t) ≥ 1− 10−n.
At the same time, ∑
t∈F
P (s, δ′, t) ≤
∑
t∈S
P (s, δ′, t) = 1
by Definition 2. Thus, for each complete action profile δ′ ∈ DA,∑
t∈F
P (s, δ′, t) = 1.
Therefore, s  [∅]1> by Definition 3. 
The claim above together with the assumption that logical system S
is strongly complete imply that X `S [∅]1> by Definition 13. Since any
derivation can use only finitely many assumptions, there must exist N ≥ 0
such that
[∅]0>, [∅]0.9>, [∅]0.99>, . . . , [∅]1−10−N ` [∅]1>.
Hence, by Definition 12 and the assumption that system S is strongly sound,
[∅]0>, [∅]0.9>, [∅]0.99>, . . . , [∅]1−10−N  [∅]1>. (10)
fs t
δ / 10-N
δ / 1-10-N
δ / 1δ / 1
v
Figure 3: A Stochastic Game.
Consider now a stochastic game depicted in Figure 3. This game has
three states: s, f , and t. The domain of actions of the game consists of a
single element. Thus, the game has only one complete action profile that
we refer to as δ. From state s the game transitions into state t with prob-
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ability 1 − 10−N and it transitions to failure state f with probability 10−N .
From state t the game always transitions back to state t. Additionally, from
failure state f the game always transitions back to failure state f . Thus,
s  [∅]1−10−n> for each n ≤ N and s 1 [∅]1> by Definition 3. The last
statement, by Definition 11, contradicts statement (10). 
8. Decidability
The languages Φ and Φ+ are not countable because we consider modalities
labeled by real numbers in the interval [0, 1]. The languages will become
countable if we restrict labels to rational numbers in the same interval. In
this case, the set of theorems of logical system L is decidable because proof of
Theorem 2 establishes completeness of our system with respect to the class
of finite stochastic games. Then, system L+ is also decidable because its
theorems are exactly the theorems of L restricted to language Φ+.
9. Conclusion
In this article we have proposed a notion of a stochastic game with fail-
ure states and a logic of coalition power with modality that incorporates
probability of non-failure. It has turned out that the logical properties of
this modality significantly depend on whether the language allows empty
coalitions. We have proven a strong completeness theorem for the language
without the empty coalition and a weak completeness theorem for the lan-
guage with the empty coalition. We have also shown that if the language
includes the empty coalition, then no strongly sound and strongly complete
axiomatization of the logic exists. Finally, we have observed the decidability
of the logical systems discussed in the article.
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